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Abstract
Urban refugees are widely viewed as anomalous—people
who stand outside a refugee regime which, in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America, is based upon rural encampment.
This article considers why states and humanitarian agen-
cies view urban refugees in this way. It examines the his-
tory of the refugee as an urban person and the recent
change in perspective which has enforced a rural norm. It
considers the extreme pressures placed upon displaced peo-
ple in the city and the consequences for communities
which contest their marginal status.
Résumé
Les réfugiés urbains sont généralement considérés comme
une anomalie – des gens qui ne tombent pas sous le do-
maine d’application d'un régime de réfugié qui, en Afri-
que, en Asie et en Amérique latine, est fondé sur des
camps ruraux. Cet article traite des raisons pour lesquel-
les les états et les organismes humanitaires conçoivent les
réfugiés urbains de cette façon. Il examine l'histoire du ré-
fugié comme citadin, ainsi que le changement de perspec-
tive intervenu récemment qui a imposé une norme
rurale. Il tient compte des pressions extrêmes exercées sur
les personnes déplacées dans les villes et les conséquences
pour les communautés qui contestent leur marginalité.
U
rban refugees, observed Rogge and Akol, are “for-
gotten people.” Writing in the late 1980s, they noted
that large communities of displaced people in the
cities of Africa were unrecognized by the authorities and
lived at the margins of local society.1 Over ten years later,
after repeated mass displacements across the continent,
the situation was unchanged: Human Rights Watch com-
mented on the many urban refugees “hidden” to govern-
ments and international agencies.2 This apparent conun-
drum—the presence/absence of urban refugee communi-
ties—is in fact a global phenomenon. More and more
refugees are city dwellers whose existence is denied by gov-
ernments and agencies. This article considers the policy of
denial and its implications for refugees.
The urban refugee presents a special case of the prob-
lem presented to state authorities by migrants in general.
In a recent assessment of global migration policy Cohen
comments that “nothing is as disturbing to national so-
cieties as the movement of people.”3 Although of enor-
mous importance to many receiving societies, especially
in the economic context, migration represents a challenge
to the modern state. The presence (or anticipated pres-
ence) of migrants may disturb ideas about citizenship,
national integrity, and local rights and responsibilities. In
the case of forced migrants – people engaged in move-
ments that are usually unplanned and unexpected – the
authorities may perceive a threat to their control over
territorial borders and to their authority in defining “in-
ternal” cultural boundaries. Mass movements of refugees
are  seldom  welcome, unless  they  fulfill  a specific eco-
nomic or ideological function, and states may go to great
lengths to exclude incomers and/or to isolate them from
the wider society.
Urban refugee communities present a further difficulty.
Power is invariably concentrated in cities and it is in the
urban context that the state exercises authority in the most
assertive and exemplary fashion. At times of economic
instability or political crisis the presence of non-national
communities can become especially problematic as they are
targeted by nativist or nationalist currents and/or by the
state itself. One outcome—and a further paradox associ-
ated with the urban refugee—is that people who are usually
“invisible” can quickly become the focus of high-profile
campaigns of exclusion.
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Urbanism and the Refugee
Over the past thirty years the urban refugee has been viewed
as anomalous and sometimes as illegitimate and unaccept-
able to state authorities and international agencies. This is
especially striking in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where
in some countries urban communities now contain a large
majority of the displaced population. The reluctance or even
refusal of governments and officials to recognize them is
inconsistent with historic practice, for traditionally people
recognized as refugees have been of urban origin and have
found sanctuary in urban environments.
In ancient traditions of sanctuary and of asylum, such as
those recorded in Jewish and Indian religious texts, certain
cities were identified as places of refuge.4 In ancient Greece
the institution of asylon embraced an understanding be-
tween city states that their citizens would be accommodated
unharmed in places protected by local deities. A similar
approach afforded the exsul (exile) of ancient Rome protec-
tion guaranteed by gods associated with specific sanctuaria,
usually located in major cities.5 In Arabia key trading cen-
tres were also sanctuaries where fugitives could expect pro-
tection. In Islamic tradition—born in the cities of Hijaz in
the seventh century CE—displacement, flight, and sanctu-
ary  became integral  to  principles of the faith and were
recognized in the notions of hijra (“emigration” /flight) and
muhajir (“emigrant”/“exile”/“refugee”), and celebrated in
the practice of hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, Najaf, Karbala,
and many lesser urban centres.6
In medieval Europe sanctuary was based upon the idea
of inviolability of religious sites, of which the most impor-
tant were the great abbeys, monasteries, and city cathedrals.
When these traditions changed in the early modern era,
giving way to notions about asylum granted by the nation-
state, the first groups accommodated as refugees were peo-
ple of urban origin who found sanctuary in the cities of the
receiving society. The Huguenots of France were urban-
ites—mainly entrepreneurs, merchants, traders, and arti-
sans—who moved primarily to the cities of Switzerland,
Holland, England and Ireland. In the case of the much-cele-
brated emigration to England, the great majority of Hugue-
nots moved to London: a small number settled in other
towns; very few settled in rural areas.7
Over the next two hundred years all manner of people were
displaced by upheavals in Europe: of those who benefited
from asylum rights most originated in the urban elite.Marrus
notes that during the nineteenth century the great majority
of those recognized as political exiles or as émigrés—the terms
most closely correlated with today’s definitions of the refu-
gee—were bourgeois.8 They were people of “the relatively
well-to-do or, at least of the once well-to-do.”9 Most had
played a leading role in nationalist movements such as those
in Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Poland, or were radical activ-
ists from France and Germany—people (almost invariably
men) involved in modernizing, essentially urban projects
who sought sanctuary in cities in which they could maintain
communication with other exiles and with movements in
their countries of origin. So many activists settled in London
that in the mid-Victorian era the city became known as “Little
Germany.”10 Some European cities also accommodated lead-
ing figures from the embryonic anti-colonial movements of
the Middle East and Asia. All were urban radicals, for rural
activists (such as the guerrilla fighters who opposed French
forces in North Africa) seldom left the remote areas which
were their military bases.11
There were exceptions to the “rule” of urbanism. In the
late eighteenth century Loyalist groups in Britain’s American
colonies who opposed independence and the establishment
of a United States of America were rewarded with grants of
land in Canada: in effect they became rural refugees. A hun-
dred years later refugees from the Franco-Prussian war were
directed by the French government to Algeria, where some
were placed on land seized from the indigenous inhabitants.
Even they were a minority of the colon population, however,
for most pieds-noirs—including refugees  from Europe—
were implanted in the cities of Maghreb.12
The pattern began to change in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when large numbers of people living in territories
under Tsarist rule sought sanctuary in North America and
western Europe. Most were Jews from Poland, Belorussia,
Ukraine, and the Baltic states who fled increasingly inten-
sive anti-Semitism, and many were of rural origin—poor
and ill-educated people who proved much less attractive to
receiving states than the émigrés of an earlier era.13 In an
important development the British government closed its
borders against them, using the Aliens Act—the first legis-
lation of the modern era to deny entry to people seeking
asylum. For the next fifty years most mass displacements in
Europe and neighbouring regions were of a similar social
composition: during the First World War some six million
people were affected in Russia alone, most of whom were
peasants from provinces occupied by German forces.14 Few
were regarded as suitable candidates for asylum and very
few became refugees, even on the loose, informal basis
operated by most state authorities. It was the fate of people
of rural origin that as more were displaced they had fewer
opportunities to find places of sanctuary, for by the 1930s
most states of Europe and North America had closed their
borders to intending immigrants.15
Elite class
When the first international legal regime on asylum came
into existence after the Second World War it was based upon
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the preference of certain states for refugees of a specific social
status. Those who wrote the Geneva Convention and shaped
refugee policy in the 1950s and 1960s were strongly influ-
enced by the ideological battles of the Cold War and the
desire to encourage movement from East to West of “escap-
ees” from Communist rule. Tuitt comments that refugees of
this period were largely “of an elite class able to perform a
relatively sophisticated ambassadorial role on behalf of the
host state.”16 They were mainly adult males of professional
standing—technocrats, scientists, and military men judged
suitable for resettlement in states of North America and
western Europe. The Convention confirmed a long-stand-
ing historic pattern: refugees were conceived as members of
the urban elite; others, including the mass of people of rural
origin, seldom appeared as candidates for asylum.
There was a further difficulty: the Refugee Convention
of 1951 defined the refugee as a person located in
Europe—displaced people elsewhere were simply ineligible
for refugee status. This had implications for all those in-
volved in mass displacements then under way in the
“Third” world. Break-up of the European colonial empires
was associated with huge population movements: in the late
1940s some fourteen million people crossed the borders of
the new states of India and Pakistan, and almost a million
were displaced in and from Palestine. The vast majority
were peasants—as people living in overwhelmingly agrar-
ian societies it was inevitable that they would make up the
bulk of those affected. None were recognized as refugees
who might be included under the terms of international
agreements then under negotiation. In the case of India the
International Refugee Organisation (the immediate pre-
cursor of the UNHCR) refused to intervene, and in Pales-
tine those affected were treated as a unique local problem.17
People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, overwhelmingly
of rural origin, did not qualify for refugee status. They were
not discriminated against as peasants, agricultural labour-
ers, etc., but because they were not Europeans and specifi-
cally not “escapees.”
For the next twenty years dominant states viewed refu-
gees in the context of their preoccupation with the Cold
War. The model candidate for asylum was a person perse-
cuted in a state of the Eastern Bloc whose journey to the
West could be presented as a flight from totalitarianism to
freedom. In the case of the US, people displaced from states
not dominated by Communist  or radical regimes were
rejected out of hand: there was simply no policy under
which they could be recognized.18 With rare exceptions,
refugees continued to come from among those who could
perform an “ambassadorial” function.19 During the 1960s,
however, this approach was modified in the light of a new
and serious difficulty—the problem of mass displacement
in Africa. Here large numbers of people had been affected
by conflicts involving the colonial powers in Congo, Kenya,
Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and
by new conflicts which affected independent states such as
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan. The US
in particular was worried by these developments: according
to a US Senate Judiciary Committee those affected were
likely to be “prey to agitators and potential reservoirs of
political and quasi-military opposition to existing re-
gimes.”20 Successive American administrations had been
sceptical about the Geneva Convention and the activities of
the UNHCR. In 1967, however, the US agreed that the
Refugee Convention should have worldwide applicability
and that the UNHCR should become a body with a global
mandate. Loescher makes a terse assessment of the con-
juncture:
The Cold War moved from Europe to Africa and Asia where
refugees and refugee assistance were now viewed as part of the
East-West struggle for hegemony in the developing world. The
UNHCR’s programs were [now] viewed by the United States
and other Western states as providing stability in a region rife
with conflict and potential for Communist expansion.21
The UNHCR had already developed a novel category—the
de facto refugee—to embrace people who did not have a case
for asylum under the strict definition imposed by the Refu-
gee Convention, and had extended its “good offices” to
many groups affected by war and civil conflict. During the
1950s the organization had been active primarily in
Europe—but by 1969 it was spending over 60 per cent of its
funds in Africa.22 Its new beneficiaries contrasted sharply
with refugees in Europe, where “escapees” and “defectors”
were still moving West and where most underwent settle-
ment, eventually becoming citizens of the receiving states.
Most displaced Africans were poor and lacked formal edu-
cation and many were of rural origin. For states of North
America  and  western Europe (some  engaged directly  in
conflicts in Africa) the priority was to contain them within
the region of displacement and to isolate them from sources
of political contamination represented by Communists and
other radical currents.
“Repackaging”
It was under these circumstances that a new regime was
developed for displaced people. Harrell-Bond describes the
change as a “repackaging” of refugees.23 They were no longer
“victims of communism and ‘votes for democracy’ ” but
problem-people who, like victims of poverty and general
developmental crisis, should be marshalled and closely
managed by special agencies.24 They were to be administered
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according to principles of “modernisation” which, since the
1940s, had been applied to economic and social problems
across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The work of the
UNHCR therefore became part of a wider effort “to assist
developing countries with their modernization and devel-
opment.”25
Dominant theories of development assumed that people
of the Third World could progress only by following mod-
els pioneered in the West. Rostow, Lerner, and others main-
tained that meaningful change would be the outcome of
imitation—not merely the application of economic princi-
ples but an embrace of Western techniques and values.26
This required only encouragement and the correct forms of
management, for as Lerner memorably observed in the case
of one “undeveloped” region, “What the West is… the
Middle East seeks to become.”27 On this view the mass of
people worldwide would soon be goal-oriented, acquisitive,
and physically mobile. They would accept radical change,
especially change in agrarian practice including relocation
of entire communities. This was the rationale for mass
movements of population  in  rural areas undertaken  to
facilitate extensive cultivation and for infrastructural pro-
jects including dams, canals, irrigation schemes, and urban
extensions. In states which rejected the Western model in
favour of Soviet or Chinese principles, “command” agendas
produced similar outcomes, moving large numbers of peo-
ple to facilitate projects such as the High Dam in Egypt, the
Volta River scheme in Ghana, and the ujaama village pro-
gram in Tanzania (those affected by these initiatives were
later to be viewed as “development-induced” migrants,
sometimes as “development-induced” refugees.)
People displaced by war and civil conflict were treated
similarly—as objects of the process of modernization. The
UNHCR was advised by strategists who also worked for the
World Bank and who favoured programs similar to the
latter’s “integrated rural development” schemes. The
UNHCR developed a specific practice in relation to refu-
gees, transporting them to camps in the countryside where
they were provided with food and shelter, allocated land,
seeds, and tools, and directed to achieve “self-sufficiency.”
In Africa over one hundred rural encampments were estab-
lished as part of a program of “zonal settlement” based on
this approach and in effect upon a new model of the refu-
gee—that of a person contained in a rural location, closely
managed and focused upon specific developmental objec-
tives. This was soon the refugee around which states and
agencies defined key areas of global refugee strategy.
Towards the Cities
Over the past fifty years governments in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America have located most refugee settlements in rural
areas. This has sometimes complemented the desire of refu-
gees to be close to places of origin but in many cases it has
proved problematic for the displaced. Kibreab shows that,
in the case of Sudan, rural settlement became a “standard
response” to the arrival of refugees, notwithstanding the
latters’ origins, experiences, skills, cultural practices, and
aspirations.28 During the late 1960s and early 1970s all refu-
gees from Eritrea and Ethiopia who arrived in Sudan, in-
cluding those of urban origin, were directed to settlements
in the countryside. Although urbanites lacked appropriate
knowledge and skills, they were directed into schemes in
which cultivation was the only option. The refugees were
under compulsion: “the authorities required [them] to
adapt to the new situation by abandoning their previous
urban lifestyle,” observes Kibreab.29 Urbanism had become
incompatible with refugee status.
Loescher comments that even when enthusiasm for rural
settlement was at its height most refugees in Africa settled
“spontaneously,” away from official projects.30 Many
evaded settlement programs and moved directly to towns
and cities where their presence troubled both colonial offi-
cials and governments of the newly independent states. The
latter were not only committed to policies of modernization
(and obliged to honour these in order to obtain external
funding) but also concerned to maintain their authority
during the tense and sometimes troubled periods which
followed independence. Isolation of refugees in remote
rural locations therefore satisfied several strategic aims. It
soon proved ineffectual, however: as Kibreab shows in the
case of Sudan, refugees of urban origin were reluctant to
move to rural settlements or even to pass through reception
centres; instead many undertook long journeys in order to
reach cities in which they could use their education, skills,
and professional expertise.31
During the 1980s the global total of refugees increased
rapidly as economic instability and the outbreak of numer-
ous “new wars” prompted repeated mass displacement in
vulnerable regions. It is likely that the rate of urbanization
of refugees increased at an even faster pace.32 In Africa most
“zonal settlement” schemes failed to achieve developmental
aims and some residents, including people of rural origin,
drifted away. Meanwhile in zones of intense crises the scale
of displacement overwhelmed aid agencies and refugees
moved through a series of states in the search for security,
their journeys facilitated by new technologies of communi-
cation and by transport networks focused on the cities. In
addition, as more international NGOs established offices in
regional centres they attracted more refugees who hoped
for employment, welfare support, and access to settlement
schemes abroad. Urban communities grew apace: Mexico
City drew refugees from conflicts in Central and South
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America; New Delhi became a temporary home for refugees
from across South Asia; Nairobi, Kampala, and Cairo at-
tracted the displaced of Central Africa and the Horn of
Africa; Conakry drew refugees from West Africa; Istanbul
accommodated refugees from the Middle East and central
Asia. There were numerous other such centres.33
Unenumerated, Unmanaged
States, agencies, and researchers often have little informa-
tion about urban refugees. Hansen notes that encamped
refugees are usually carefully monitored: “Their identity and
location are known. They live in locations that are super-
vised and managed by the national government or by inter-
national organizations.”34 Urban refugees, however, are
usually dispersed, unenumerated, and unmanaged. In the
jargon of international NGOs they are “spontaneous” or
“self-settled” refugees—people who have not entered the
encampment regime or have abandoned it.
A minority of refugees in urban locations do have formal
status.  For almost sixty years Palestinians have  lived in
camps in the cities of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and in
the 1970s and 1980s large numbers of Vietnamese refugees
were accommodated officially in camps in Hong Kong. In
addition millions of Afghans are still located in settlements
in and around Peshawar in Pakistan for which international
agencies take responsibility. But these are a small minority
of the mass of urban refugees: as aliens living outside ap-
proved locations the majority lack rights, including rights
of residence and rights to employment, housing, education,
and welfare. Many live at the margins of urban soci-
ety—some, in effect, beyond the margin.
One of the rare independent studies of urban communi-
ties, Cooper’s Needs Assessment of the Ethiopian and
Eritrean Refugee Populations in Cairo, published in 1993,
gave early warning of developments under way world-
wide.35 It established that the city accommodated several
large communities, drawing refugees across vast distances
by means of what Cooper called a “magnet effect” associ-
ated with the presence of local and international NGOs, the
prospect of employment, and the hope of admission to
resettlement programs in the West.36 Cairo had become a
regional hub for refugees of many origins, part of a network
of increasingly complex migrations which operated inde-
pendent of states and agencies. The report had important
implications: it was likely that in many other regional cen-
tres similar communities were in formation and that to-
gether they were exercising an important influence on
global refugee movements.37
A few years later the UNHCR published its own research
on urban refugees. The agency conducted regional work-
shops in Harare and Kuala Lumpur and in 1997 produced
a detailed report, UNHCR’s Policy and Practice Regarding
Urban Refugees.38 This is probably one of the most contro-
versial documents ever produced by the agency and, as we
shall see, its conclusions were later modified by the organi-
zation’s own officials. It is worth considering in some detail.
The report began by noting that urban refugees could be
difficult to identify  among the “massive  populations of
illegal migrants” found in a number of regions.39 The cor-
relation of urban refugees with illegality was an indicative
starting point, for the report was suffused with pejorative
references to people whom UNHCR officials  viewed  as
anomalous and in effect as inauthentic. The agency had no
definition of the urban refugee, the report continued, not-
ing that “the most commonly articulated definition of an
urban refugee [among UNHCR officials] is that of an indi-
vidual of urban origin… anyone who is not a farmer or a
peasant.”40 By using occupational status rather than loca-
tion as a criterion, this approach excluded at a stroke the
large numbers of people of rural origin now part of urban
populations. The UNHCR could account for 56,000 urban
refugees on its case-lists, the report noted, and on this basis
suggested a possible global total of 200,000.41 At a time
when refugee numbers worldwide were approaching thirty
million (including refugees and people “of concern” to the
UNHCR), of which a substantial proportion were already
to be found in cities, the calculation was a gross underesti-
mate. It reflected a widespread belief among agency officials
that “real” refugees were people of rural origin properly
encamped in rural locations, and that those who had cho-
sen not to enter the camp regime, or who had escaped it,
were of little account.
The report was sceptical about urban refugees in gen-
eral—even the modest numbers who fell within the defini-
tions used by UNHCR officials. It noted that some lacked
genuine claims for asylum while others were dysfunctional
personalities. It observed:
Urban refugees and asylum seekers tend to include a wide
variety of people, some, but by no means all, of whom have
genuine asylum claims. They include opportunistic and dy-
namic individuals as well as those who failed to survive as part
of the normal migration (or refugee) flow—the maladjusted
[sic], the social outcasts etc—a factor which can make status
determination difficult. Furthermore, since such movement is
often stimulated, at least partially, by a desire to improve their
economic potential, urban refugees and asylum seekers tend to
share a culture of expectation, which, if not satisfied, often leads
to frustration and violence.42
Urban refugees engaged in all manner of uncontrolled
activities which were not part of “normal” migratory move-
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ments, the report suggested. People who joined urban refu-
gee communities were “irregular movers” against whom
“preventive measures” should be taken; meanwhile there
should be “curative measures [sic] to deal with individuals
who have already moved irregularly.”43 Urban refugees
were said to make unreasonable demands on the UNHCR’s
budget and upon the energies of its officials. Many agency
staff had concluded that they should not be provided with
assistance—that the UNHCR should not “reward” people
who moved from rural settlements to the city “in order to
seek better conditions and prospects.”44 “A privileged few”
left rural encampments for the city, lobbying for improved
assistance or access to settlement programs and becoming
“aggressive and violent” if their expectations were not
met.45 Among the most vehement protesters were the “ir-
regular movers.” those whose applications for asylum had
been rejected, and “the psychologically disturbed.”46
Some urban refugees had been “politically manipu-
lated,” the report observed: their journeys to the city im-
plied illegitimate activities including the establishment of
“networks”; their movements were sinister—“far from be-
ing random and spontaneous, such movements are organ-
ised” and raised questions about motives and outcomes.47
The report proposed that no “irregular movers” should
ever be registered as refugees; that all should be excluded
from resettlement schemes and should be denied assistance
including help with education; and that people found out-
side their regions of origin should be recorded on new
databases with the aim of containing further movement.48
Denial
The report reflected an increasingly hostile stance taken by
Western governments towards refugees in general and long-
distance migrants in particular. From the mid-1980s West-
ern politicians and media became increasingly concerned
about those who sought sanctuary in Europe, North Amer-
ica, and Australasia. The collapse of Communism meant
that refugees no longer appeared as uncomplicated victims
of culpable action by totalitarian states; rather they were
poor and often desperate people who (publicly at least) had
little to offer host societies. A pattern of conduct evident one
hundred years earlier was repeated as desired states of asy-
lum closed their borders to those in pressing need. Refugees
were now depicted as calculating, aggressive, and undeserv-
ing—as opportunists who sought to exploit the credulity of
Western publics. Like the politicians of Europe and North
America, UNHCR officials were prepared to accept the
presence of closely managed refugee communities in remote
locations; when refugees appeared elsewhere, however, they
became objects of suspicion and the focus of punitive action:
in particular,  when they entered urban  networks which
facilitated movement to the North they were to be treated as
dangerous and threatening.
The 1997 report represented a policy of denial and of
rejection. It ignored the earlier analyses of Chambers,
Rogge and Akol, Cooper, and Kibreab.49 It minimized the
scale and extent of urban refugee communities and, using
mainly anecdotal evidence, went on to misrepresent them.
In 2002 Human Rights Watch published the findings of its
own research on refugees in Nairobi and Kampala, reaching
very different conclusions. It noted that “tens of thousands”
of displaced people from Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere
lived in “dire and dangerous” conditions.50 They existed at
the margins of city life—not only poor, hungry, and often
ill but also subject to beatings, sexual violence, harassment,
extortion, and arbitrary arrest and detention at the hands
of criminals, persecutors from their countries of origin, and
local officials, police and armed forces. Their communities
were invisible to the local authorities and to certain agen-
cies, observed Human Rights Watch: they lived “hidden in
plain view.”51
This account was soon confirmed by Horst’s detailed
study of Somalis in Nairobi. She noted the presence of a
large and growing community confronted by problems of
illegality which were exploited by officials and by the Ken-
yan police.52 Meanwhile studies of Burundians in Dar El
Salaam and of a range of refugee groups in Johannesburg
had identified a similar picture in other cities of Africa.53
Human Rights Watch questioned the “blanket assump-
tion” made by the UNHCR that “most refugees should not
be moving to or living in urban areas.”54 Some officials
within UNHCR had similar criticisms, prompting new re-
search by the agency’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit
(EPAU) in Cairo, Nairobi, New Delhi, and Bangkok. The
Unit argued for a different approach: in the case of New
Delhi its researchers found that most refugees lived without
formal recognition. Like those in African cities they were
technically illegal, leaving them open to arrest and depor-
tation. They were poor and faced discrimination and har-
assment: many were compelled to work illicitly, and under
intense pressure some had left India by clandestine
means.55 A UNHCR workshop emphasized the need for a
new policy on urban refugees based on a sympathetic un-
derstanding of their problems and a commitment to the
principle that “refugees in urban areas are of concern.”56
Refugee Resistance
In 2001 the UNHCR revised its count of urban refugees to
13 per cent of the global refugee population—some 1.9
million people but still a fraction of those living in urban
environments.57 In 2006, as part of a global survey, it issued
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a new statement on urban refugees. More displaced people
were moving to cities, it observed, with the aim of escaping
“restrictive encampment schemes instituted by host coun-
tries.” They faced problems with local officials and “exploi-
tation, police abuse, arbitrary arrest and deportation.”58 For
the first time, the UNHCR identified a general tendency to
treat urban refugees “with considerable suspicion” and im-
plicitly criticized the assumption that all must be “irregular
movers.” Almost ten years after its first report the agency was
still unable to offer a revised policy, however—an index of
the continuing reluctance of states, transnational bodies,
and local NGOs to accept that urban refugees in the global
South are people who have good reason to seek sanctuary
and who should be treated appropriately.
The UNHCR report of 1997 had identified urban refu-
gees as people likely to have unreasonable aspirations and
expectations. Violating “normal” patterns of migration by
evading or escaping rural encampments, they demon-
strated dysfunctional behaviour which could be manifested
in aggressive or even violent conduct. This assessment was
based in part on experiences of UNHCR officials who had
witnessed protests at the agency’s offices world-
wide—events which have recently grown in scale and be-
come much more numerous. Urban refugees often
organize to demand faster processing of applications for
refugee status or resettlement, for improved welfare bene-
fits, for the right to work, or against harassment and abuse
by police and officials—issues over which most poor and
vulnerable people might be expected to mobilize. For the
UNHCR this has been evidence of personal instability and
of the inherent threat posed by all “irregular” movers. The
presence in cities of mobile, self-directed refugees contin-
ues to violate the idea that displaced people must be helpless
and dependent—an idea inherited from modernization
theory and which, decades after it has been discredited as a
principle of development strategy, continues to inform
those who shape migration policy.
Urban refugees in general are becoming more organized
and more outspoken. This is in part a reaction to increased
pressure from local authorities, in particular the determi-
nation of some states to enforce rural encampment or even
deportation. Burundian refugees have long lived in camps
in western Tanzania and increasing numbers have made
their way to the capital, Dar El Salaam, living illegally as
what Sommers calls “undercover urbanites.”59 Those dis-
covered by the authorities face arrest and, since 2003, return
to the Burundi-Tanzania border without documents—and
with all the attendant dangers.60 In Thailand, where many
Burmese refugees have lived in Bangkok and other cities,
officials have recently forced thousands of people to move
to areas in which they are restricted to rural camps. In 2005
the government announced that those who resisted en-
campment would lose UNHCR protection: they would also
be barred from resettlement and could face arrest or even
deportation to Burma. Similar measures have been threat-
ened against Burmese refugees in Bangladesh.61
Official hostility towards urban refugees can take the
form of extreme violence, especially when migrant commu-
nities organize publicly to defend their interests. In recent
years there have been numerous public protests in cities
including New Delhi, Bangkok, Nairobi, Kampala, Mos-
cow, Beijing, and Cairo, often directed towards the local
authorities and/or the UNHCR and other agencies. Some
have been attacked by the police and the army, with mass
arrests and heavy casualties. In 2002 hundreds of Burmese
refugees surrounded the UNHCR office in New Delhi,
demanding faster processing of applications for refugee
status and reviews of cases which had been rejected. Ban-
ners read “SOS” and “Victims of UNHCR—silent killer.”62
The following year there were further demonstrations, call-
ing for adequate subsistence allowances, help with basic
health care, and a guarantee against refoulement. After at-
tacks by police, refugee organizations said that hundreds
had been arrested and twenty seriously injured.63 In May
2005 a combined force of 12,000 regular police and special
riot police invaded a camp for displaced persons in Khar-
toum, Sudan, killing fourteen people after protests in which
residents had resisted “relocation.”64 In December 2005
thousands of Egyptian riot police surrounded a protest by
Sudanese refugees outside UNHCR offices in Cairo. Dem-
onstrators were attacked with a show of violence that
astonished witnesses and resulted in many deaths, includ-
ing several among children. Government spokesman put
the number of fatalities at twenty-seven; according to Egyp-
tian human rights organizations the real figure was over one
hundred.65 Refugee community organizations alleged that
the UNHCR was complicit in the planning and execution
of the assault.66
The Cairo events had been in the making for many years.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s refugees arrived from
across Africa  and  the Middle East: in 2005 Moorehead
observed that they made their way to the Egyptian capital
across vast distances “by a hundred different paths.”67 Some
were granted formal recognition by the UNHCR but many
were refused asylum or chose not to enter a refugee status
determination (RSD) process they regarded as arbitrary
and unjust.68 Forced to live precariously in an intimidating
urban environment, they made repeated individual and
collective protests to the UNHCR, including allegations
that the agency recognized only those applicants prepared
to make payments to officials and that the UNHCR oper-
ated RSD on a “quota” system determined by the Egyptian
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government. Welfare groups, including those run by inde-
pendent religious charities, observed that as refugee com-
munities expanded, their relations with the local state
became increasingly tense.69
In the early 1990s Cooper proposed an “open dialogue”
between refugees, NGOs, and government officials. The key
aim, he maintained, must be to ensure that refugees gained
a measure of control in their lives, which were becoming
increasingly stressful and insecure.70 More than ten years
later there was still no meaningful form of communication:
to this extent the confrontation of December 2005 was
predictable, even if the scale and intensity of violence on the
part of the state could not have been anticipated. The Cairo
events were an expression of official intolerance towards
desperate people who dared to challenge their lowly status:
when they mobilized as social/political actors the state took
punitive measures, determined that they should be neither
seen nor heard.71
Global trends suggest that more such tragedies are likely
to occur. More displaced people are moving to the cities,
where more of the population lives at the very margin of
survival. For governments eager to demonstrate their
authority refugees present an attractive target: vulnerable
and often “voiceless,” they are a convenient focus for exem-
plary action against “illegals” and “criminals”—the same
deviants who populate official discourses of the refugee in
Europe and North America. For centuries the city was a
place of  sanctuary: for people of the  global South  it  is
increasingly a place of danger.
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